Friday, 22 January 2010
Somalis Killed in South Africa
Thursday, 21 January 2010
Somalia's instability is not Ethiopia's fault
Your article "Violence, fear and confusion: Welcome to the Horn of Africa" (World News) implied Somalia was at peace before Ethiopia's intervention in 2006. Assumptions used to criticise Ethiopia in relation to the instability are unfounded and fallacious. Lack of peace and stability in Somalia date from the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991.
The instability in Somalia is the result of lack of a state structure and responsible government since that time. Ethiopia has assisted the political forces in Somalia to find a solution, and from the outset Ethiopia has called upon the international community to help. The two transitional governments of Somalia are the result of a protracted political dialogue and it is ridiculous to conclude that these governments are the making of Ethiopia. Furthermore, it is an insult to the Somalis who have been engaged in these negotiations.
The intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia was not, as claimed, initiated by the US. Ethiopia acted in response to a threat to its national security. The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) declared a jihad against Ethiopia and promised that its acolytes intended to establish a caliphate government in Addis Ababa. The ICU had assassinated officials in Ethiopian border towns, terrorised civilians and destroyed public and private property. The attempt to relate the border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea to the instability in Somalia is misleading.
Ethiopia's concern at what is happening in Somalia is genuine as the two countries share a 1,300km border. The interventions of Eritrea, which has no common border with Somalia, are dangerous and opportunistic.
Berhanu Kebede Ambassador Ethiopian Embassy London SW7
by Omar A. A. Sharmarke Tuesday, January 19, 2010
The terrible events of Dec. 3 reverberated around the world. Somali doctors, information technology and engineering graduates, alongside their families, began the morning full of hope and pride, yet many were not to see the sun set that day. They were among the brightest and the best of Somalia, and so were the ministers who lost their lives.
But as the recent events in Aarhus, Denmark, Mogadishu and over the skies of Detroit on Dec. 25 show, the current situation in Somalia and across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen not only threatens the lives of Somalis, but also people beyond its borders.
However, Somalia is not the ultimate failed state of popular perception. Its people are resilient and manage to survive in conditions that are probably well beyond the imagination of most readers. In Mogadishu, a city of two million, people carry on, despite the fighting, the shelling, the displacement. Over 100 Somali-led reconciliation processes have taken place at local and regional levels since 1991 — and they’ve proved the basis for stability in Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug state in central Somalia.
While Somali reconciliation and mediation efforts will be the key to sustainable peace and stability, the international community — including the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the African Union, the Arab League, the European Union and the United Nations — has an important role to play. Somalia and Yemen must be properly on the agenda at the London conference at the end of this month.
As 2010 unfolds, our collective vision should be to see the beginnings of a secure, stable and prosperous Somalia, at peace with itself and its neighbors, where its citizens can go about their lives in safety and provide for their families with confidence and dignity. Let us strive for a resurgent, tolerant society, built on respect for traditional Somali cultural and religious values.
The Transitional Federal Government, as its name suggests, is a temporary structure for developing the environment necessary to achieve this objective. It is a transitional mechanism that will enable the people to decide for themselves how they want to be governed, free from outside interference and coercion.
The transitional government’s principle purpose is to prepare the way for the establishment of legitimate and accountable public institutions. (We have already taken the initiative and hired Price Waterhouse Coopers to ensure the accountability of international donor funds.) These institutions will form the basis of a stable, representative government that can begin to alleviate the trauma of the last 20 years.
We will achieve this by building professional, representative security forces; creating transparent and accountable public institutions based on the principles of civic responsibility and good governance; developing a fair and impartial judicial system; and increasing economic opportunity through investment, training, health and education.
Given the complex and extremely difficult circumstances that recent events have so graphically illustrated, achieving all this will be an extraordinary challenge. It will require the combined effort of the whole Somali people, as well as assistance from outside. Only in partnership with all Somalis and the support of the international community will success be possible. It will take time, determination and patience but it can be done. Let us all take up this challenge. Let 2010 be the start of something new.
Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke is prime minister of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia.
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Saving Somalia: Theseus Paradox
Since last 20-years, the clan social system and its political implication was either ignored or misunderstood. It may be misunderstood as is manifested by the power sharing schemes that were designed for Somali groups to share power since 1991 which only resulted in 15 failed governments). More importantly , policy makers and the international players may be using an obsolete model of Somalia. Perhaps Somalia of 2010 is not the same Somalia of 1990; Is this Theseus Paradox ? But prior to casting Somalia as an obsolete model let us examine how and what drives the evolution of Somali politics. Is it the clan system? Is it the need for a nation-state?
Notwithstanding the contemporary socio-political evolution of Somali inhabited areas particularly the birth and demise of the short lived Somali Democratic Republic. There is no historical data proves the existence of a unified Somali entity or a long lasting Somali peace. The idea of peaceful unified state for all Somali inhabited areas has always been an imprecise, unattainable and fuzzy concept.
Since the beginning of recorded Somali history, clan based rivalries and all out wars had unleashed worst of human nature in an endless fierce competition for everything material and non-material alike. All Somali clan conflicts embody an element of pride to uphold, revenge to conduct, clan interest to better, clan based morality to fulfill and resources to compete for. Clan empathy and clan based morality have always been the driving force behind most clan conflicts. Clan empathy and clan based morality assert an obligation that often supersedes any other form of social recognition and human virtue.
It must however be admitted that clan conflict alone did not and does not preclude sense of nationhood. Somali people are known to unite often in defense of their common interest when and if such interest is realized. Yet, historically, each clan (or group of clans) preferred to govern their affairs. In fact pre-colonial Somalia is known to be a nation of many states with diverse forms of self rule and a form of governance that distributed authority among the clans. This traditional, decentralized system was also a mechanism for conflict resolutions that ensured transient but effective peaceful co-existence.
Centralized governing structure in the Somali peninsula was first initiated by the European rulers. The fascist wars against Somali sultanates in central and northern Somalia (1922-1929) were the first attempts to centralize authority. The centralization of authority was later legitimized by the subsequent Somali governments between 1960 -1991. Rigidity of this imposed centralized control over clan affairs had rendered the clan based social interaction of Somali people so brittle that it eventually caused the demise of centralized authority and with it the sense of nation-state. It can also be argued centralization has produced some form of rent seeking behavior of clans on the expense of other clans.
In spite of the popular claim that clan competition is a result of dictatorship (of Barre regime) or even a result of colonial era legacy, there is yet to be any empirically grounded finding that documents such claims (except of course few deductively attained conclusions). On the other hand, clan based rivalry and factionalism is historically and culturally ever-present (before and after the Barre regime). Clan conflict was very common in pre-colonial era, during the European rule and persisted throughout the short existence of Somali nation-state (1960-1991). Moreover, clan rivalries at times involve the use of missionaries, foreign powers to gain edge on other clans; a trend that continues till today.
The modern manifestation of clan alliances with non-Somali entities includes the use of foreign basis to fight the last Somali government in 1980s. As is with the case everything Somali, the use of foreign power is either condemned or commended, depending on the clan, its interpretation and the prevalent clan morality at any given time. For instance the all clan based Somali faction SSDF, SNM, USC, SPM have used foreign basis primarily Ethiopia to fight against their unified nation-state. The supporters now defunct United Somali Congress tend to have whole heartedly supported the launching of cross border raids from Ethiopia on Somalia including bombing of civilian targets, movie theaters, postal stations and the like. These acts were justified on the basis of clan morality and indeed these campaigns eventually led to the overthrow of Barre government in 1991. This also was (at least partially) a cause for the ensuing massacre of civilian population in Mogadishu 1991 which again was justified through clan morality. It is this clan based moral value that allows one group to blame others when and if their clan interest is rivaled. For instance, the clans that supported USC’s alliance with Ethiopia in 1989-1991 seem to condemn SNF’s alliance with Ethiopia 1992-1994 to uproot extremist groups in the town of Luq Southwest Somalia.
What is the rationality of morality based on clan interest? If it is not a residue form Somali evolution from primates, this clan based morality would be a self serving moral relativism that is most inconceivable and most intellectually debilitating for any sane human. Each clan’s action are noble to its own members! To each clan, its history is more glorified than all other clans. This is the constructed social reality of clan based morality. Indeed, this clan based morality supplants any other virtue including nationhood, statehood or even humanity. Therefore, policy makers must account for the realities of this society and the implications of clan social structure on policy, politics and a nation-state. This is particularly important when the international community wants to impose a common and unifying Somali nation-state
Many policy makers and scholars tend to minimize the importance and/or the relevance of clan identity in Somalia’s protracted conflict. They claim that calling attention to the role of the Somali clan is simply a restrictive primordialist view (even though clan identity doesn’t necessarily disallow other constructivist and instrumentalist views). It is the clan that allows the emergence of clan politicians that could manipulate the clan (an instrumentalist view).
Some scholars even argue that foreign powers are the reason Somalia could not constitute peace. Others argue that factors such as delivery of social service, justice and economic opportunity play far more significant role (in part to justify their attempts to constitute central authority). Yet, these scholars fail to explain the manifestation of clan based behavior amongst Somali populations in the west. They conveniently ignore or are perhaps unable to admit the role of the clan as observed in Somali communities in the west. For instance, clan identity is demonstrably and unmistakably most ubiquitous and most noticeable in all social realities of Somali communities in Northern America and Europe. It is the very factor of clan that drives social bond not to mention the role of the clan in business, civic and other associations.
We now know that western social justice and economic opportunity cannot and could not do away with clan based morality, clan conflict and clan dynamics in general. In fact, clan affiliation exclusively governs the entire processes of social, political and civic transactions of Somali people. It is the single most significant factor to consider while addressing the Somali problem.
It must not surprise anyone that even the religious extremism prevalent in Southern Somalia has an element of clan. Today’s religious fundamentalist do come from predominantly certain areas or are stronger in certain areas. Most of the extremism confirms to the dictates of the clan system in a subliminal manner. The recent conflicts in Jubbaland are clear indication of this fact
In October 2009 while at a Somali related event, I was shocked by the claims of a prominent scholar who argued for the need to eliminate the Somali clan system (as if it is something that could be just casually deleted from the psyche of the society). Although, well meaning, purely logical analysis to find solutions for the Somali conflict often leads to impractical, overzealous solutions that have no local mandate or support from the very people it is intended to help
The burning question is, do the Somali politicians and their international allies pay enough attention to the significance of the clan as a social issue (not a political one).? Do they asses the effect of this social reality on policy toward political settlement? I argue that most politicians and all the international players did not and do not understand the issue of clan based society as a social one with political implications. The solutions that the international communities and the Somali politicians devised since 1991 were solely political solutions to primarily a social problem. The focus I believe must not be a politically driven power sharing plan but rather a social program that facilitates a political settlement as I explain below.
Historically, Somali clans constituted rule of law, self rule and governance of social and natural resources through a unique and distributed system of command and control that relied on consent of the clan groups. A form of a robust clan democracy that enabled Somali clans resolve conflicts, share resource and even rally for a nationalistic cause. One such clan sanctioned unity is the 1530s unity under Imam Ahmed AlGhazi which was purely based on clan understanding rather than a centralized control by far away authority
The efforts of international community seem to focus primarily on constituting a central authority for all Somalia without any due attention to the underlying social realities of the post collapse or the social origins of the political question of Somalia. It seems that the clan reality is synthetically incorporated into the question but not in its natural format. For instance the 4.5 scheme used to assemble the interim Somali parliament is a measure intended to provide fair power sharing among clans, yet most of the current members of the parliament do not have local mandate from the regions they are supposedly to represent. (This is particularly true for the parliamentarians from Somaliland and Puntland).
More over, the paradigm used to design policy is an obsolete one based one a unified nation-state with political rivalry. Unlike the 1980s and early 1990s, the Somali population in the horn of Africa has more of a clan based social, political and demographic re-alignment. The New York Times reported in the 1990s that nearly four hundred thousand residents of Mogadishu have been forcefully removed from their home in Mogadishu. Most of these immigrated to other parts of Somalia mainly to Jubbaland, Puntland and Gedo Region. Similarly commerce routes and trade relationships have been reconfigured since the collapse of the state. For instance Puntland has far more robust trade with the Ogaden region than with the Southern part of Somalia (mainly due to clan relationship/affiliations). These realities must factor in any policy design for the former Somalia.
Most planners, analysts and international players face the Theseus Paradox when dealing with the issue of Somalia. Today’s reconfigured new realities are not fully recognized and appreciated by the interaction al community and Somali politicians alike.
The State of Puntland and the Republic of Somaliland who have successfully in constituted a socially approved, clan facilitated social solutions to political problems in their part f the former Somalia. They represent new realities , a new dimension that must be recognized and awarded. Ignoring them will not result a better solution for the Southern Somali groups.
Former warlords (now politicians) and their international allies must not impose a centralized unifying entity on Somali people. The international community should only facilitate regional settlements to address genuine grievances of Somalis against their fellow Somali. The international community must also respect the dominion of the clan group over administering their own affairs as they see fit rather than be a nuisance. There is no and there will be no central government without the approval and blessing of all Somali clans and that cannot begin with power sharing scheme like the 4.5 plan. It must begin with clan negotiations, local settlement, independent states and perhaps eventually a union of Somali states.
Arguments on how to find a political solution for Somalia has become “argumentum ad infinitum” except that the arguments were always centered on national government for a unified Somalia. Perhaps the best way to save Somali people is to allow alternative approaches including the formation of regional groupings of self-administering states that could eventually unite in a confederation of Somali states. The idea of regionalism in the former Somalia is NOT an exactly episode of A Nightmare on Elm Street series. The Somali people are clan based society and perhaps the solution to their problems could only be achieved through genuine, robust, bottom-up, partitioned clan negotiation.
If the last 20-years could serve as a historical lesson, continuing with the misguided approach of centralized, national unity government will produce and only guarantee more of clan based rivalry zeal and for further destruction. The alternative approach of regionalism and self-rule, on the other hand, has been an incredible success story in Puntland and Somaliland. It is time for the Somali people and the international community to move on and accept the reality. It is time to acknowledge that we all have been trapped in Theseus Paradox! Today’s Somalia is not the Somalia that once was.
Abdul Ahmed III Email: abdul.ahmed@thoapi.org Contributor to The Horn of Africa Policy Institute www.thoapi.org
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UK muslim Police angry with Anti-terror Policy
A Muslim police body has criticized Britain’s anti-terror strategy for fuelling anti-Muslim sentiments and deepening divisions within British society, reported the Guardian. A Muslim police body has criticized Britain’s anti-terror strategy for fuelling anti-Muslim sentiments and deepening divisions within British society, reported the Guardian on Thursday, January 21.
“The strategies of Prevent were historically focused on so-called Islamist extremism,” the National Association of Muslim Police (NAMP) said in a memorandum to the Commons Select Committee on the Prevent Strategy.
“This has subjected the biggest black and ethnic minority community, and second biggest faith group, in an unprecedented manner, stigmatising them in the process.
Launched by the Home Office in 2003, the “Prevent” strategy is an updated version of the government counter-terrorism strategy (called Contest).
The government says the strategy aims to prevent Muslims from being lured into extremist ideologies.
"It can be argued that there is a connection in the rise of Islamophobia and our Prevent programme, as it feeds on the stereotypes that the media and some rightwing parties promote, ie that all Muslims are evil and non trustworthy."
"We deal with so-called Islamist extremists as [being] terrorist, whilst the right wing and separatist are dealt with as [being] extremist – hence facing lesser legal action.
Anti-Muslim
The police body warned that the anti-terror strategy has fuelled anti-Muslim sentiments in the country.
"The hatred towards Muslims has grown to a level that defies all logic and is an affront to British values,” it said.
“The climate is such that Muslims are subject to daily abuse in a manner that would be ridiculed by Britain, were this to occur anywhere else."
NAMP said that the strategy was "stigmatising" Muslims by focusing on "so-called Islamist extremism."
British Muslims, estimated at nearly two million, have been in the eye of storm since the 7/7 attacks.
They have repeatedly complained of maltreatment by police for no apparent reason other than being Muslim.
A Financial Times opinion poll showed that Britain is the most suspicious nation about Muslims.
NAMP warned that Muslims were subjected to “daily abuse” due to the strategy.
“We must not diminish our British values further by continuing to allow such behaviour and polices to continue unchecked.
“Never before has a community been mapped in [such] a manner,” NAMP said.
“It is frustrating to see this in a country that is a real pillar and example of freedom of expression and choice.
The police body warned that the strategy has deepened community divisions, warning of a repeat of similar rights of the 1970s and 1980s.
“We appear to have ignored the lessons learnt from these dark days.
“Our British system is a model for the world to follow, yet we have embarked on a journey that has put this very core of British values under real threat.”